Nuclear Threat by Terrorists: Should India retaliate ?

The People of India are now confronted to repeated threats of Nuclear Bomb Attack, the latest being from Hafiz Saeed, the Head of Jamaat Ud Dawa, the parent organization of Terrorist group Lashkar e Taiba, which was responsible for 26/11 Attacks and the Parliament House Attack (2001) in India.

The Threat cannot be ignored as both Pakistan Military and ISI would have least objection in resorting to Nuclear Bombs when all their Strategies fail. During Kargil War of 1999, there were reports of movement of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons towards Indian Borders, which hints that non-political forces in Pakistan cannot be taken lightly.

Nuclear Bomb Explosion

An Artistic Impression of Nuclear Bomb Explosion

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy for Nuclear Weapons.  In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of “retaliation only”.

With Growing Political instability in Pakistan, chances are there that Nuclear Weapons might be misused by certain extremist forces. The success of any diplomatic pressure on Pakistan depends heavily on the control of Political forces over Army and Extremists in Pakistan.

Development of Nuclear weapons in Pakistan started in January of 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, when he was the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources.  The decision to go nuclear came after a disastrous military defeat in 1971 by India.  Bangladesh with Indian assistance separated from Pakistan.

The threat in front of India is not Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal but capture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons by Extremists.   Intelligence Satellite photos and other sources estimate that there are fifteen locations (in Pakistan) where weapons or nuclear materials are likely to be kept.  Six of these have been attacked by terrorists, although no weapons or materials have been taken.

In August 2012,  a group of militants assaulted a Pakistani base that some believe houses nuclear weapons components. Nine militants and one soldier were killed in a two-hour firefight at the Kamra air force base.  At least five other sensitive military installations have also come under attack by militants since 2007.

The United States, which is duly concerned that Pakistan’s nukes could fall into the wrong hands, almost certainly does have a plan to neutralize those weapons in the event of a coup or total state collapse. When the question was put to Condoleezza Rice during her 2005 confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, she replied, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”

” The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored are the mostly heavily guarded in the country. Even if some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. “With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice,” says Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad’s Quaid-i-Azam University.

Pakistan, with an estimated 90 to 120 warheads, is now believed to be churning out more plutonium than any other country on the planet — thanks to two Chinese-built reactors that are now online, a third that is undergoing trials, and a fourth that is scheduled to become operational by 2016.

A body called the National Command Authority, headed by the Pakistan prime minister, is supposed to be the ultimate decider of whether to initiate a nuclear attack. In reality, however, it is the military that controls the process from top to bottom. Pakistan has never formally stated its nuclear doctrine, preferring to keep the Indians guessing as to when and where it might use nukes. But now it appears to be contemplating the idea of actually using tactical nuclear weapons in a confrontation with India.

Pakistan has been following the tactic of hiding behind its nuclear shield while allowing terrorist groups to launch proxy attacks against India.  India has successfully tested an anti-ballistic missile shield that could be deployed “in a short time” to protect New Delhi and Mumbai.

In 2004, India announced a new war-fighting doctrine dubbed “Cold Start,” which called for the capability to conduct a series of cross-border lightning strikes within 72 hours. The idea was not to hold territory or threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, but to use overwhelming firepower to deliver a punishing blow that would fall short of provoking a nuclear response.

Pakistan’s reaction was to double down on developing its short-range battlefield nuclear weapon, the Hatf IX. Any incursion from India would be met with a nuclear response even if it meant Pakistan had to nuke its own territory.

There is no doubt that India is a Giant vis-a-vis Pakistan when it comes to Strategic Weapons or Defense Forces. Its Defense Budget is 7 times that of Pakistan and is certainly a superior counterpart. Though India has not made any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has between 80 and 100 nuclear weapons,  consistent with earlier estimates that it had produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 75–110 nuclear weapons. As of 1999, India was estimated to have 4200 kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium from its power reactors, which is equivalent to roughly 1000 nuclear weapons.

The Strategic Superiority of India  is widely accepted across border. According to Pakistani Defense Expert, M Asghar Khan, if Pakistan ever tried Nuclear Options in case of War India can retaliate and within minutes destroy three or four of Pakistan’s cities and also Pakistan’s main command and control capacity. Anything comparable that Pakistan could do may damage India in many ways but it would be nothing compared to the damage that would have been done to Pakistan. Pakistan would, as a result, be mortally damaged  whereas India would be damaged to a much lesser extent and would still survive as a nation.

In October 2012, India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from “No first use” to “No first use against non-nuclear weapon states” in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India’s “strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence”.

In April 2013,  Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that regardless of the size of a nuclear attack against India, be it a miniaturized version or a “big” missile, India will retaliate massively to inflict unacceptable damage.

The concluding line is that any chances of Nuke Attacks even by Non-State forces would be suicidal for Pakistan and may lead to realignment of Political Boundaries in South Asia.